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Abstract
Many consequentialists argue that you ought to do your part in collective action
problems like climate change mitigation and ending factory farming because (i) all such
problems are triggering cases, in which there is a threshold number of people such that
the outcome will be worse if at least that many people act in a given way than if fewer
do, and (ii) doing your part in a triggering case maximizes expected value. I show
that both (i) and (ii) are false: Some triggering cases cannot be solved by appeal to
expected value, since they involve infinities, and some collective action problems are
not triggering cases, since they involve parity. However, I argue that consequentialism
can still generally prohibit failure to do your part in those collective action problems
where we believe that so acting would be impermissible.
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1 Collective Action Problems
Collective action problems take many forms. I will focus on a kind of collective action problem
in which a much better outcome would result if all or most people performed a given action
than if few or none did so, and yet it is tempting to think that no particular individual could
make any difference by acting one way or the other.
Examples: A much better outcome would result if everyone reduced her carbon footprint
than if no one did. But it is tempting to think that no single individual could make a
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difference by reducing her carbon footprint. Average global temperatures would be the same
regardless of whether one drove a hybrid or a gas-guzzler.
If everyone were to refrain from buying factory farmed meat, things would be much better
than if no one did so. But it is tempting to think that no single purchase would affect how
many animals are raised and slaughtered in factory farms. The supply chain just isn’t that
sensitive to individual purchases.
If everyone were to vote for the better candidate, then that candidate would win. If no one
were to do so, then either the worse candidate would win, or else democracy might collapse
(if no one voted at all). But it is tempting to think that no single individual would make a
difference to the outcome. Only tiny races for dog-catcher are ever decided by a single vote.
To fix terminology, say that an exceptional act is one such that things would be better if
few or no people did it than if all or most did, but where arguably no single such act would
make things worse. The term is supposed to evoke the idea that in performing such an act,
one seems to be making an exception for oneself. Not voting, buying factory-farmed meat,
and not reducing one’s carbon footprint are examples of exceptional acts.
My focus in this paper is whether and to what extent consequentialism permits performing
exceptional acts. Prima facie, it might seem that consequentialism will often permit such
exceptional acts. For consequentialism is concerned with bringing about the best outcome
possible, and if any particular exceptional act would make no difference to how good the
outcome is, it seems that that act would be permitted by consequentialism. This implication
might constitute a serious objection to consequentialism. But my concern is not with whether
consequentialism’s treatment of collective action problems should make us more, or less,
confident in the truth of consequentialism. Rather, I am concerned simply with whether
and to what extent consequentialism permits exceptional acts. I leave it to others to decide
whether consequentialism’s verdicts, and reasons for those verdicts, are adequate.
Many consequentialists have argued that, in fact, consequentialism does not permit ex-
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ceptional acts (Kagan 2011; see also Singer 1980; Parfit 1984; Norcross 1997, 2004). Following
Kagan, say that in a triggering case there is some threshold number of people k such that
the outcome would be worse if at least k people were to perform a given exceptional act
than if fewer were to (there may be several such thresholds). These consequentialists then
make two claims: First, in triggering cases, the exceptional act is impermissible because it
has sub-maximal expected value.1 It has a high probability of making things slightly worse,
or a low probability of making things much worse, or something in between, but in any case
its expected value will be lower than that of not performing the exceptional act. Second, all
collective action problems are triggering cases.
This standard treatment is attractive and elegant. But it has also been met with skepti-
cism (Nefsky 2011; Budolsfon 2018). I argue that both of its component claims are in fact
false, but not for the reasons emphasized by critics, and, more importantly, not for reasons
that significantly threaten the overall verdict. In each case, a slight tweak saves the verdict
that consequentialism generally prohibits exceptional acts.
Here is the plan: In §2, I show that expected value theory provably cannot prohibit
exceptional acts in some infinitary triggering cases but argue (contra Budolfson) that it is
likely to do so in more realistic cases. In §3, I turn to the second claim. While conceding the
flaws in previous attempts to show that all collective action problems are triggering cases,
I argue that a better strategy is available, based on the claim that all relations of the form
is exactly as F as are equivalence relations. Hence there cannot be a sequence of outcomes
(ordered by the number of people who perform the exceptional act) with the first better
than the last but each exactly as good as its predecessor. But as I discuss in §4, this is
not sufficient to show that all collective action problems are triggering cases. Parity lurks.
While there cannot be a sequence of outcomes with the first better than the last and each
1The expected value of an act is the result of adding up, for each possible outcome, the product of the
value of that outcome and the probability that the act will result in that outcome. In symbols: EV(A)
=
∑
i P (Oi | A)V (Oi). The consequentialist theory then says that an act is permissible just in case no
alternative act has higher expected value.
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outcome exactly as good as its predecessor, the possibility of parity means that there can be
a sequence of outcomes with the first better than the last and each outcome not worse than
its predecessor. But I show that one attractive theory of decision-making under parity allows
consequentialism to prohibit exceptional acts even in parity-laden, non-triggering collective
action problems. If this decision theory is correct, then even though not all collective action
problems are triggering cases (because of parity) and expected value theory can’t prohibit
exceptional acts in all triggering cases (because of infinities), consequentialism still prohibits
exceptional acts in most of the kinds of collective action problems with which we are most
concerned, and where we tend to judge that exceptional acts would be impermissible.
2 The Appeal to Expected Value
Let’s start with the bad news. The standard consequentialist treatment of collective action
runs aground in infinitary cases. Suppose there are (countably) infinitely many people, each
facing a switch. If only finitely many people flip their switches, then everyone spends eternity
in heaven. But if infinitely many people do so, then everyone spends eternity in hell.
This is a triggering case, where the threshold number is ℵ0, the cardinality of any count-
ably infinite set. The outcome would be much worse if at least ℵ0 people flipped their switches
than if fewer did so. But here the appeal to expected value is impotent. For no single switch
can mean the difference between infinitely many switches being flipped and only finitely many
being flipped. Thus each person has probability 0 of making the outcome worse by flipping
her switch, and flipping the switch does not have lower expected value than not flipping it.2
2See also Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne (2004) for a related but importantly different case. In a group
version of their Satan’s Apple, there are infinitely many people, each with a slice of apple. If infinitely many
eat their slices, everyone goes to hell, while if finitely many do so, everyone goes to heaven. It is good for
each person to eat her slice, but the goodness of the gustatory pleasure is far outweighed by the badness
of hell. In this case, for each person, the outcome would be better if she were to eat her slice than if she
were not to, holding fixed what others do. Hence she would be required to eat on consequentialist grounds.
This yields the puzzling result that every combination of acts is worse than some alternative combination. In
my case, for each person, the outcome would be exactly as good whether or not she were to flip her switch.
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Infinities are weird, and in this case I think we have no considered judgment that the
exceptional act is indeed impermissible. Consequentialists may therefore be willing to concede
that they cannot prohibit exceptional acts in all triggering cases, hoping instead to do so in
those finite cases where we tend to judge that the exceptional act is impermissible.3
Budolfson (2018) argues that even this more modest goal is unattainable. Focusing on
the case of factory farming, Kagan (2011) begins by conceding that it is unlikely that each
chicken purchased causes one more chicken to be raised and slaughtered.4 But there must
still be some threshold, such that if that many chickens are purchased in a given period,
approximately the same number of additional chickens will be raised and slaughtered.
Thus we know that there is some triggering number T (more or less), such that
every T th purchase (more or less) triggers the order of another T chickens (more
or less). I don’t have any idea what that number is, but I do know that whatever
it is, I have a 1 in T chance of triggering the suffering of another T chickens
(more or less). And so in terms of chicken suffering, my act of purchasing a
chicken still has an expected disutility equivalent to one chicken’s suffering. And
since, by hypothesis, this is greater than the pleasure I will get from eating the
chicken, the net expected utility of my purchase remains negative. As I walk to
the butcher counter, then, not only don’t I know whether my act will have bad
results, I don’t even know what the chances are that my act is a triggering act.
But I do know, for all that, that the net expected results of my act are bad. So I
should not buy a chicken. (2011, 124).
As Budolfson explains, this reasoning relies on the assumption that the expected effects
of the relevant act are approximately equal to the average effects of that sort of act. Given
modest assumptions about the efficiency of the marketplace, each act of purchasing a chicken
has, on average, the effect of one chicken being raised and slaughtered. And, Kagan suggests,
Hence consequentialist considerations seem to permit, but not require, each person to flip. And here, there
are many optimal combinations of acts, namely all those where only finitely many people flip.
3This concession does mean denying that it is part of the nature of morality that it satisfies the ‘Principle
of Moral Harmony,’ which states that ‘when all the members of a social group do what they morally ought to
do, the group as a whole does benefit more than it would have from the performance of any worse alternative
set of actions’ (Feldman 1980, 167). Feldman gives independent reasons to doubt this principle, however.
But see Portmore (2018) for a defense of a modified principle of moral harmony.
4See Broome (2018) for discussion of thresholds in the case of climate change.
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if you are ignorant about the location of the thresholds and about how others will act, the
expected number of extra dead chickens resulting from an individual chicken purchase will
be approximately equal to that average effect. (As a side note, it is worth mentioning that
consequentialism will still prohibit buying a chicken even if that act has an expected increase
in the number of chickens produced of less than one, provided that the suffering of each
chicken far outweighs the difference in the pleasure one gets from eating a chicken and the
pleasure one would get from alternative vegetarian meals. If the suffering of a chicken in
a factory farm still outweighs, say, the aggregate net pleasure of eating 100 chickens, as it
plausibly does, then buying a chicken would be prohibited even if its expected increase in
the number of chickens produced were only around 0.01.)
Budolfson (2018) argues that Kagan is overly optimistic. This is because we are in a
position to know about the presence of ‘buffers’ in the supply chain which reduce both the
probability of an individual act making a difference as well as the size of the difference it
will make, if it makes any difference at all (see also Nefsky 2011). A buffer is anything
that makes production less sensitive to individual consumer acts. As one example, a chicken
wholesaler might have the option of selling unsold meat at cost to a dog food manufacturer or
rendering plant, with the result that a small reduction in demand from ordinary consumers
will not yield a concomitant reduction in the number of chickens the wholesaler purchases
from producers. Budolfson argues that these buffers make the expected effect of an individual
act significantly lower than the average effect of acts of that type, with the result that the
relevant exceptional act does not have sub-maximal expected value.
Does our knowledge of these buffers scuttle the appeal to expected value? I do not think
so. It is important to emphasise that buffers in a supply chain do not eliminate the existence
of threshold numbers. Instead they help determine what those threshold numbers are, in
particular by placing the thresholds farther apart than they would otherwise have been. But
Kagan has already conceded that the thresholds may be very few and far between, and that
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the probability of an act making any difference at all may therefore be very low. So why
should the existence of buffers pose a threat to the appeal to expected value? Expected value
calculations take into account all probabilities, no matter how small, meaning that there is
no positive number such that the probability of an act making a difference must be above
that number in order for it to be prohibited on expected value grounds. What matters is the
relation between the probability of making a given difference and the size of that potential
difference, where an increase in one can compensate for a decrease in the other. And Kagan
makes the plausible assumption that, in general, buffers which reduce the probability of an
individual act making a difference will yield a compensating increase in the size of the effect
that an individual act will have, in the unlikely event that it does make a difference. If this
is right, then chicken-purchasing will be prohibited on expected value grounds, regardless of
the size and effectiveness of the buffers in question.
Budolfson argues that this assumption is mistaken and that buffers can reduce the prob-
ability of an act making a difference without yielding a compensating increase in the size of
the effect that the act will have, if it does happen to make a difference. He writes (p. 8):
even in the very unlikely event that, say, an individual purchase of meat really
did succeed in making the price of animals at one point at a production end of the
supply chain $0.01 higher than it otherwise would have been, that would not make
the dramatic difference to the number of animals that are brought into existence
that it would have to make in order for the possibility of such a threshold effect
to drive the expected effect toward the average effect, in part because the number
of animals that are brought into existence is suprisingly insensitive to very small
changes in price at that location for a variety of reasons.
In a footnote, Budfolson supports this contention by observing, for the case of cattle
raising, that ‘insofar as ranchers judge that capital should be invested in raising cattle rather
than other investments, they will tend to raise as many cattle as they can afford to breed
and feed within that budget, letting the ultimate extent of their profits fall where it may at
the feedlot’ and that many ranchers ‘use the nutritional well-being of their herd as a buffer
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to absorb changes in market conditions, feeding their cattle less and less to whatever point
maximizes the new expectation of profits as adverse conditions develop’ (ibid).
However, this observation at most shows that individual acts are unlikely to have any
large effects in the short term. But consequentialists care about an act’s long-term effects.5
Perhaps, over the course of the next year, ranchers will raise and slaughter the same number
of cattle regardless of any (relatively small) price changes. But profits one year will affect how
things go the year after, and the year after that. At the margins, lower profits discourage new
entries into the industry and may lead some existing ranchers to abandon cattle production
altogether or to diversify their investments, for instance by shifting toward raising sheep
for wool. This makes evident that quite a bit of work is being done by Budolfson’s caveat
about ‘insofar as ranchers judge that capital should be invested in raising cattle.’ We cannot
hold fixed people’s judgments about where to invest capital, since these may themselves be
affected by consumer acts. Indeed, it is by influencing investment decisions that individual
acts may be most likely to have large effects. Lower profits also mean that ranchers who
persist in cattle raising will have less capital the next year. They might still ‘raise as many
cattle as they can afford to breed and feed within that budget,’ but the budget will be lower,
possibly resulting in fewer cattle bred and fed. Of course, individual acts are unlikely to have
such dramatic effects, but that has already been conceded by consequentialists like Kagan.
The point is that there is still a small probability of their having such large long-term effects.
I am therefore unconvinced by Budolfson’s contention that the effects of individual acts will
be either null or too small to have any hope of being prohibited on expected value grounds.
Let me now turn to an example Budolfson gives to illustrate the importance of buffers:
Richard makes paper T-shirts in his basement that say ‘HOORAY FOR CONSE-
QUENTIALISM!’, which he then sells online. The T-shirts are incredibly cheap
to produce and very profitable to sell and Richard doesn’t care about waste per
se, and so he produces far more T-shirts than he is likely to need each month, and
5This focus on the long term raises Lenman’s (2000) famous ‘cluelessness’ problem, however.
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then sells the excess at a nearly break-even amount at the end of each month to
his hippie neighbor, who burns them in his wood-burning stove. For many years
Richard has always sold between 14,000 and 16,000 T-shirts each month, and
he’s always printed 20,000 T-shirts at the beginning of each month. Nonetheless,
there is a conceivable increase in sales that would cause him to produce more
T-shirts—in particular, if he sells over 18,000 this month, he’ll produce 25,000
T-shirts at the beginning of next month; otherwise he’ll produce 20,000 like he
always does. So, the system is genuinely sensitive to a precise tipping point—in
particular, the difference between 18,000 purchases and the ‘magic number’ of
18,001. (2018, 6)
Budolfson argues that, given the facts about buffers in the T-shirt supply chain (the option
of selling excess merchandise at cost) and about the historical trends in consumer purchasing
decisions, the expected effect on T-shirt production of a single act of purchasing a T-shirt is
‘essentially zero’ because ‘there is virtually no chance that exactly 18,001 people are going
to buy Richard’s T-shirts this month and trigger a dramatic threshold effect’ (ibid, 6). Thus
the expected effect of buying a T-shirt is much lower than the average effect of consumers’
acts of buying T-shirts. He concludes that the problem with Kagan-style reasoning is ‘that it
overlooks the fact that we can know enough about the supply chains...to know that threshold
effects are not sufficiently likely and are not of sufficient magnitude to drive the expected
effect of consumption anywhere close to the average effect’ (ibid, 7).
Now, we must concede that there can be no decisive, a priori argument that the expected
value of purchasing a chicken (or other exceptional acts) will be sub-maximal, because as
Budolfson rightly notes, ‘the knowledge available about the mechanisms at play in such
situations matters greatly’ (ibid, 11). After all, it is rational subjective probabilities that
matter in calculating expected values, and rational subjective probabilities depend on the
agent’s evidence. We can even imagine an evil demon planting misleading evidence to suggest
to each person that they are nowhere near any thresholds, in which case expected value theory
will not prohibit the exceptional act.6
6Note also that in cases where we know we are nowhere near any thresholds, we often do not judge that
the exceptional act would be impermissible. For instance, deciding not to engage in any food production is
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But it is important to be clear about what is going on in Budolfson’s example. As noted
above, buffers in the supply chain do not eliminate the existence of thresholds, but instead
help determine where they are. This means that, when you possess detailed information
about the exact workings of buffers, this could in principle provide evidence about what the
threshold numbers are. And when you also possess information about historical trends in
consumer purchasing decisions, this provides evidence about how many others will perform
the relevant act. Now, it is not surprising that if you have evidence about what the threshold
numbers are and about how many others will perform the relevant act, the expected effects of
your act will probably be lower than if you didn’t possess all that evidence. Think of it this
way: In cases where threshold numbers are few and far between, we already know that it is
very likely that your act will make no difference. Hence it is very likely that, in the limiting
case where you are fully informed about all aspects of the situation, and, in particular, about
the exact (post-buffer) threshold numbers and about how everyone else will act, the expected
effects of your act will be null. More generally, as you gain more and more evidence about
what the threshold numbers are (e.g., by learning more and more about the buffers) and
how others will act (e.g., by learning more and more about historical demand), the expected
effects of your act will probably become lower and lower, the exception being the rare case
in which you are in fact right at the threshold number, in which case the expected effects of
your act will actually increase as you become more informed.
But in order for the expected effect of buying a chicken on the number of chickens raised
and slaughtered to be ‘essentially zero,’ it is not enough to know that there are certain
buffers in the supply chain and that there are historical trends in consumer decisions. This
is because mere knowledge that there are certain buffers provides little or no evidence about
where the new threshold numbers are (or about the possible magnitudes of an individual
act’s effects, assuming the previous argument is correct), and because mere knowledge that
an exceptional act, as things would be worse if everyone did this than if no one did. But it is permissible for
me not to produce food, since I know I am nowhere near a threshold where doing so will make things worse.
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there are historical trends in consumer decisions provides little or no evidence about how
many others will perform the relevant act.
In order for the the appeal to expected value to fail, you would also need detailed evidence
about what the trends in consumer decisions in fact are, as well as detailed evidence about
the exact workings of these buffers, so as to be able to better locate where you sit in relation
to any thresholds. These facts were simply given to us in Budolfson’s T-shirt case. But in
real-life we have no such knowledge. I have no idea even approximately how many chickens
are consumed worldwide each year. And while I believe that consumption is increasing, with
the effects of a growing population and people rising out of poverty outweighing increased
vegetarianism, I am ignorant about its rate of increase. Now, some evidence about consumer
trends is available online. But more to the point, while I have some idea about the nature of
buffers in the global chicken supply chain (e.g., that some excess is sold to rendering plants),
I have no idea even approximately what the new threshold numbers are that result from the
operation of these buffers. And given the complexity of global economic forces, not even
industry experts could determine even roughly what the threshold numbers are that result
from these buffers, especially given that those thresholds concern the number of chickens
raised and slaughtered over the long run.
In real-life cases, then, we are in roughly the situation that Kagan and others suppose.
Namely, we are very ignorant about where the thresholds are and about how many others
will perform the relevant exceptional act, and so we are also very ignorant about how close or
far we may be from hitting the threshold.7 Along with my previous argument that buffers do
7Budolfson might concede that you should have a roughly uniform probability distribution over hypotheses
about exactly how many others will buy chickens, as well as a roughly uniform probability distribution over
hypotheses abvout what all the threshold numbers are. However, he could rightly point out that this is not
enough to vindicate the appeal to expected value. For you might have a non-uniform probability distribution
about what the threshold numbers are, conditional on any given hypothesis about how many chickens will be
purchased. That is, even if you have no idea what demand will be or where the new, post-buffer thresholds are,
you might nonetheless think that the two are correlated, such that the thresholds and anticipated demand,
whatever they are, are likely to be far apart. In the T-shirt case, this would be the case if you thought that
Richard sets up his supply chain with the aim of ensuring that demand will not approach the new thresholds.
But I see little reason to think that demand and the new, post-buffer thresholds will be correlated in this
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not prevent individual acts from having large long-term effects, this ignorance about where
we sit in relation to any thresholds largely vindicates the appeal to expected value.8
In conclusion, I think Budolfson is greatly overstating things when he writes that ‘in
the real world we generally have access to additional evidence that makes it empirically
indefensible to equate the expected marginal effect and average effect in such a way, and
that makes it similarly indefensible to assign a probability to making a difference that would
be sufficiently high to vindicate the conclusions of the [expected value response to triggering
cases]’ (ibid, 10-11). Budolfson is correct that the expected value of purchasing a chicken
(or any other exceptional act) will not necessarily be sub-maximal regardless of what one’s
evidence might be, but wrong in thinking that the expected value will not be sub-maximal
given our actual evidence.9 I conclude that expected value considerations will still prohibit
exceptional acts in most of the triggering cases with which we are most concerned.
way in real-world cases like factory farming, given that these cases involve a large and fluctuating number of
producers, operating independently, none of whom has the power to unilaterally determine global production
and none of whom is likely to care much about exact global demand.
8In this respect, the cases of factory farming and climate change are importantly different from that of
voting, contra Budolfson (2018, 8). Polling data and knowledge of the voting rule allow citizens to locate
approximately where they sit in relation to the relevant thresholds. In cases where the race isn’t close, this will
justify a tiny probability of one’s vote making a difference. And this probability must be further discounted
by one’s confidence that one has accurately identified the candidate who is in fact better, as Lomasky and
Brennan (2000) note. So consequentialism will not always require voting. But when the race is close, the
stakes are huge, and one candidate is clearly better, as in the case of the last several US presidential elections,
say, consequentialism may require voting despite the still tiny probability of making a difference. See also
Barnett (ms) for an argument that, given two modest assumptions which are often met in real-life, voting
will be required on consequentialist, difference-making grounds.
9As a reviewer noted, Budolfson might be interpreted not as making a claim about expected effects, given
a typical consumer’s actual evidence, but rather as providing us with additional evidence such that, in light
of that evidence, we see that the expected effects of the exceptional act are too small for it to be prohibited on
expected value grounds. But as noted, the complexity of economic forces means that even industry experts
will be ignorant of where the thresholds are and how large the long-term effects of a given consumer act
might be. So, even relative to such experts’ evidence, the expected effects of purchasing a chicken will be
approximately equal to one additional chicken produced. And it would not help to interpret Budolfson as
making a claim about expected effects relative to the objective chance function. For the global economy is
arguably not a physically chancy system, meaning that the objective chance of an individual act making a
difference is either 0 or 1, depending on whether we are in fact right at a threshold, but that we don’t know
which it is. And if it is the latter, then the expected effect of purchasing a chicken, relative to the objective
chance function, will be much greater than the average effect of chicken-purchasing acts.
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3 Imperceptible Harms
Turn now to the second component of the standard consequentialist treatment of collective
action cases. This is the claim that all collective action problems are triggering cases: there
is always some threshold number of people k such that the outcome would be worse if at
least k people performed a given exceptional act than if fewer did so. (As noted, there may
be multiple thresholds, and indeed it could be that every additional exceptional act makes
the outcome worse.) This claim is intuitively compelling in the cases of voting and factory
farming. But it is less obvious in other cases, like that of climate change.
Let us consider a famous case which puts pressure on this claim, namely Parfit’s (1984,
80) case of the harmless torturers. There is a patient hooked up to a torture machine. Other
than the patient, there are n people, including you, each of whom has a switch in front of
her. Flipping that switch will slightly increase the voltage going into the patient. If no one
flips her switch, the patient will receive no voltage and experience no pain. If everyone flips
her switch, the patient will receive a very high voltage and experience great pain. But for
all j, the patient cannot tell the difference between the pain involved in the outcome Oj in
which exactly j people flip their switches and the pain involved in the outcome Oj+1 in which
exactly j+1 people flip their switches. Hence it seems like each possible outcome Oj+1 is just
as painful—and therefore just as good—as its predecessor Oj. Thus, the harmless torturers
case seems like a non-triggering collective action problem.
I begin by giving my own response before explaining how it avoids the problems facing
previous consequentialist-friendly responses. I claim that for all F , the relation is exactly as
F as is an equivalence relation.10 (Indeed, I think this fact is a conceptual truth, though I
10This seems obvious to me, but oddly, it has been scarcely defended in the literature. Broome (2004,
151-2) does claim that equally as good as is transitive. This follows from his defintion, on which A is equally
as good as B just in case (i) A is neither better nor worse than B, and (ii) for any C, C is better (worse)
than A if and only if C is better (worse) than B (ibid, 20). He also notes that it would follow from analysis
on A is equally as good as B just in case the degree of A’s goodness is identical to the degree of B’s goodness,
given the transitivity of identity. Broome would presumably thinks that the same holds if we substitute any
other predicate for ‘good.’ I do not, however, commit myself to either of Broome’s proposed analyses.
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do not need this stronger claim here.) Being an equivalence relation, it is transitive. Hence
there cannot be a sequence of outcomes such that the last is F -er than the first and yet each
outcome is exactly as F as its predecessor.
In the harmless torturers case, the relevant F is painful. From my general claim, it follows
that the relation is exactly as painful as is an equivalence relation, and hence transitive. Thus,
there cannot be a sequence of states such that the last is more painful (for the patient) than
the first and yet each state is exactly as painful its predecessor. Given that On is indeed
more painful than O0, it follows that there must be at least one state that is not exactly as
painful as its predecessor.11
This does not mean that the patient can tell the difference between any two adjacent
states. The two states may be indiscriminable in the sense that the patient is not in a
position to know whether they are exactly as painful as each other (Williamson 2013 (1990)).
Indiscriminability is non-transitive. This should not be surprising. Given our limited powers
of discrimination, it should not be assumed that one is always in a position to tell whether
two states are exactly, as opposed to merely almost exactly, the same as each other, even
with respect to some phenomenal property. This is especially true in cases like this one,
where the states cannot be experienced simultaneously (meaning that the comparisons rely
on memory), not to mention that extreme pain interferes with one’s cognitive capacities.12
11See also Barnett (2018) for a different innovative and, in my view, compelling argument that cases like
the harmless torturers must be triggering cases.
12Compare Graff Fara (2001) and Mills (2002), who defend the fallibilist claim that we are not always in a
position to know whether two things look the same to us. Graff Fara (2001) rebuts an argument that limited
powers of discrimination mean that looking the same, understood as sameness of visual phenomenology, is
non-transitive. She considers two possible ways of cashing out the claim that our powers of discrimination
are limited. First way: ‘For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in colour, sound, position, etc.), when
we perceive an object for the entirety of an interval during which it changes by less than that amount, we
perceive it as not having changed at all during that interval’ (917). But this claim is false, for it entails that
we never misperceive an object as having changed in the relevant respect when it has in fact not changed at
all. Second way: ‘For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in colour, sound, position, etc.), we cannot
perceive an object as having changed by less than that amount unless we perceive it as not having changed
at all (as having changed by a zero amount)’ (917). But this claim does not entail that phenomenal sameness
is non-transitive. For ruling out the possibility of an interval during which the object appears to change by
some amount below the threshold leaves open the possibility that the object will appear to change discretely
at some point in an interval where it in fact changes continuously.
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And defining what it is for one state to be exactly as painful as another in terms of the
impossibility of discriminating between them in a pairwise comparison smacks of the crude
operationalism that has long since fallen into disrepute in the philosophy of science; we would
not, for instance, define what it is for one thing to be exactly as hot as another in terms of
the impossibility of some thermometer’s giving different readings for them.
(It may also be that for each state, it is indeterminate, and not merely unknowable,
whether it is exactly as painful as its predecessor, even though it is determinately true that
not every state is exactly as painful as its predecessor. Then, it would be determinately the
case the harmless torturers case is a triggering case, but indeterminate where the thresholds
are. This indeterminacy-laden case can be treated along consequentialist lines by appeal to
a decision theory for indeterminacy which is analogous to the decision theory for parity that
I explore in the next section. See also footnote 26.)
What about the claim that phenomenal properties are response-dependent in the sense
that judging that the property applies in a given case makes it the case that it so applies? If
the patient judges that each state is exactly as painful as its predecessor, might that make
it the case that they are exactly as painful as each other? I do not need to deny that the
monadic property of being painful is response-dependent (though I am skeptical of this claim).
It may be that whenever a subject judges, of the state she is currently in, that it is painful,
then it is painful. But such response-dependence is implausible for relations of comparative
painfulness, unless further constraints are imposed. For we can imagine a subject who judges
that state S1 is more painful than S2, and also judges that S2 is more painful than S1; an
unconstrained response-dependence thesis for more painful than would then entail, falsely,
that it is non-asymmetric. Worse, we can imagine a subject who judges that S1 is more
painful than S1; unconstrained response-dependence would then entail, again falsely, that the
relation is non-irreflexive. Thus, any response-dependence thesis for the relation more painful
than must impose constraints that ensure that it satisfies various structural constraints such
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as irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity. Once these constraints are imposed, it is unclear
why the response-dependence theorist would reject constraints which ensure the reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity of exactly as painful as.
Let me consider three objections.13 The first is that I am simply dismissing the Sorites.
Nefsky (2011, 383-9) levels this charge at Kagan, whose argument we will briefly consider
below. The standard Sorites, applied to the case at hand, involves the three (classically)
jointly inconsistent claims that O0 is not painful, that On is painful, and that for all j, if
Oj is not painful, then neither is Oj+1. This is a genuine paradox, and I offer no solution
here. Nor do I need to, for what matters is not (or at least not only) whether a given state is
painful, but rather (or in addition) how painful it is.14 And even if no single switch flipped
can change the outcome from not painful to painful (a difference with respect to a vague,
monadic property), this does not mean that no single switch flipped can affect the morally
significant underlying dimension of how painful it is.
Now consider a different Sorites-like paradox, involving the four jointly inconsistent claims
that O0 is not painful, that On is painful, that if one state is exactly as painful as another
then one is painful just in case the other is, and that for all j, Oj is exactly as painful as
Oj+1. Here, the last claim is not intuitively compelling, once we distinguish between states
being exactly as painful as each other, and their being merely almost exactly as painful as
each other. Of course, one can make a theoretical argument in favor of this last claim, but it
does not have the same intuitive pull as the third claim of the standard Sorites. Thus, I am
13A brief comment on a fourth objection: I am not reifying ‘feels,’ in the way that Dennett’s (1978, xix-xx)
imaginary society reifies ‘fatigues.’ That is, I do not focus on the relation feels the same as, analyze it as has
the same feel as, and appeal to the fact that identity (and hence identity of feels) is an equivalence relation
(see Williamson (1994, 179) for discussion).
14Bacon (2018) argues for the stronger conclusion that it is irrational to care intrinsically about the vague.
For example, it is irrational to care about whether one is bald, over and above all the underlying facts relevant
to baldness, such as how many hairs one has, how they are distributed, how people react to you, and so on.
I am sympathetic to Bacon’s claim, and to the analogous view that vague properties are not intrinsically
morally significant. But for my purposes, I need only the weaker claim that it is irrational to care exclusively
about the vague, and that facts involving vague properties do not exhaust what is morally significant, to the
exclusion of the underlying more precise properties and relations.
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not dismissing the Sorites, but only this latter psuedo-Sorites, which is no paradox at all.
The second objection is inspired by Temkin (2012, 164), who considers and rejects the
claim that it is a conceptual truth that for all F , is F-er than is a transitive relation:15
Consider the following example. Let us define the relation “larger than” as follows:
for any two people a and b, a is larger than b if a is heavier than b or if a is taller
than b. Clearly, so defined, a might be larger than b, because heavier, and b might
be larger than c, because taller, yet a might not be larger than c, as c might be
both heavier and taller than a. So it appears than one could have a “...er than”
relation that is not transitive.
If Temkin is right, that would cast doubt on my claim that for any F , the relation is
exactly as F as is an equivalence relation. For we could imagine defining is exactly as large
as thus: for any two objects a and b, a is exactly as large as b if and only if either a is exactly
as heavy as b or a is exactly as tall as b. Defined thus, we might have a, b, and c such that a
is exactly as large as b, b is exactly as large as c, and yet a is not exactly as large as c.
My response is flatfooted: neither the comparative ‘larger,’ nor the relation it expresses,
work in the way Temkin is imagining. And it is even clearer that neither ‘is exactly as
large as,’ nor the relation it expresses, work in the way I just sketched. Admittedly, this
dispute is difficult to settle. We are close to bedrock. But standard linguistic treatments
of comparatives (Kennedy 2007; Schwarzschild 2008; see also Kamp 1975, 145) agree that
‘is exactly as F as’ and ‘is F -er than’ always express transitive relations. Indeed, it is hard
to see how to devise a plausible compositional semantics for comparatives, including for the
morpheme ‘-er,’ the modifier ‘exactly’ (and the contrasting modifiers ‘approximately’ and
‘roughly’), and especially for the positive form ‘is F ,’ which rejects these claims (see Nebel
2018).16 While I do not take this to decisively settle the matter, I think that it remains
15See also Temkin (1996) and Rachels (1998).
16A note on compositionality and ‘exactly.’ The expression ‘is exactly as painful as’ is not an idiom;
it is not like ‘kick the bucket,’ where we understand the expression by learning it as a whole rather than
by understanding the meanings of the component words and how they are put together. Therefore, our
semantics should have it that ‘exactly’ means the same thing in expressions like ‘is exactly as painful as’ as
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overwhelmingly plausible that ‘is F-er than’ and, more importantly for my purposes, ‘is
exactly as F as’ always express transitive relations.
The third objection is that discriminability by humans may be necessary in order for
two states to differ in a morally significant way. Differences in painfulness that cannot be
detected by humans are not morally significant. On this view, while is exactly as painful
as may be transitive, is exactly as painful in the morally relevant sense as is non-transitive,
since indiscriminability is non-transitive.17
There are two points to make in response to this objection. The first is that this view
entails that is exactly as good as is also non-transitive, which conflicts with the claim that
all relations of the form is exactly as F as are equivalence relations, regardless of whether
the relevant F is painful, good, or anything else. The second is that there is good reason to
doubt that discriminability is necessary for the difference between two states to be morally
significant. It is important to distinguish between cognitive (or belief-like) judgments about
painfulness and the underlying painfulness itself. As defined above, indiscriminability is un-
derstood in terms of cognitive judgments: two states are indiscriminable (for an agent) with
respect to painfulness just in case the agent is not in a position to know (or, perhaps, to reli-
ably judge) that they differ in their painfulness. This is the sense in which indiscriminability
may be non-transitive. But why privilege these cognitive judgments about phenomenology
over the underlying phenomenology itself? If two states differ in how painful they are, why
should the agent’s inability to have knowledge of their differing painfulness mean that this
in expressions like ‘has exactly two children’ and ‘arrived at exactly noon.’ It also means that expressions
of the form ‘is exactly as F as’ should work the same way regardless of whether ‘F ’ expresses a phenomenal
property like painful, a non-phenomenal, descriptive property like tall, or a normative property like good.
And they should work the same way regardless of whether ‘F ’ expresses a unidimensional property like tall
or a multidimensional property like large. This suggests, for example, that ‘is exactly as painful as’ cannot
mean the same as ‘is indiscriminable with respect to pain from’ (even setting aside the non-transitivity of
indiscriminability). For an expression like ‘is exactly as tall as’ does not mean the same as ‘is indiscriminable
with respect to height from.’ Perhaps it is impossible tell the difference between two things differing in height
by a Planck length and their not differing in height at all (and we can even imagine this to be a nomological
impossibility and not merely a practical one); hence two things could indiscriminable with respect to height
even if their heights differ by a Planck length, but they would then not be exactly as tall as each other.
17Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this objection.
18
difference is morally insignificant?
To press the point further, consider a creature with less capacity for fine-grained in-
trospective knowledge than humans. Certain animals might well fit the bill. Perhaps this
creature has no capacity for cognitive judgments whatsover. In this case, all states count as
indiscriminable for that creature. But, assuming that the creature can feel pain, and different
levels of pain, it is implausible to say that none of the creature’s possible pain states differ
in their moral significance. Alternatively, we can imagine that the creature has the capacity
for introspective knowledge, but only of a very limited and coarse-grained sort. While there
are many different levels of pain that the creature can feel, it is only ever in a position to
know that two pain states differ when one is very slight and the other very intense. Again,
it is implausible that this epistemic limitation means that the difference between slight and
moderate pain, or between moderate and very intense pain, is morally insignificant. The
lesson is clear: differences in painfulness must sometimes be morally significant even when
the subject is not in a position to have knowledge of their differing painfulness.18
Now I want to argue that my approach is superior to existing consequentialist treatments
of harmless torturers-style cases. The first reason is that my approach does not rely on
contentious claims about verbal reports and their relation to phenomenal states. Kagan
(2011) notes that if asked in O0 whether she is in pain, the patient will answer ‘no,’ while
18The objector might respond that the sense in which the tiny differences between adjacent states of the
machine are undetectable is that they feel the same to the agent, and that if two states feel the same, they
must be equally morally valuable. I have avoided talking in terms of the locution ‘feels the same as’ and
instead focused on the relation is exactly as painful as, since the former locution is unhelpfully ambiguous.
As Keefe (2011) notes, it has at least two distinct readings. First, there is a purely phenomenal reading,
on which ‘S1 feels the same as S2’ can be glossed as ‘The feel of S1 is the same as the feel of S2.’ On this
reading, ‘feels the same as’ expresses a transitive relation, since identity is transitive. However, one might
doubt the legitimacy of reifying feels in this way, as noted in footnote 13. Second, there is a reading of ‘feels
the same as’ on which it means ‘feels as though they are the same.’ This is a cognitive reading, on which two
states feel the same roughly when the agent judges (or is inclined to judge), on the basis of introspection,
that they are the same in the relevant respect. So understood, ‘feels the same as’ expresses a non-transitive
relation. But the holding of this relation does not suffice for two states to be equally morally valuable, since
as argued above, it is implausible to privilege cognitive judgments about, or based on, phenomenology to the
exclusion of the underlying phenomenology itself. Absent some other proposed reading of ‘feels the same,’ I
conclude that it never expresses a relation that is both non-transitive and such that its holding between two
states suffices for them to be equally morally valuable.
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if asked in On whether she is in pain, she will answer ‘yes.’ Hence there must be adjacent
outcomes which differ with respect to the patient’s answer to the question whether she is in
pain. Kagan says that the two outcomes must therefore feel different.
McCarthy and Arntzenius (1997) previously gave a more sophisticated version of this
argument. They imagine allowing the patient infinite time to play around with the machine,
trying out each of the states multiple (even infinitely many) times, and each time recording
her best description of how painful it felt, using whatever language she likes. Allowing the
patient to try out each state multiple times mitigates worries about the possible instability
of her responses and gives an accurate record of her overall dispositions with respect to how
to describe her experience. But the basic argument is the same as Kagan’s. The patient’s
verbal response disposition for O0 clearly differs from her verbal response disposition for On.
Thus, there must be two adjacent outcomes that differ, if only slightly, with respect to the
verbal response dispositions they yield. And this means that those two adjacent outcomes
must not feel the same to the patient.
This strategy has two significant limitations. First, verbal reports, and even long-run
verbal report dispositions, need not accurately reflect underlying phenomenal states (Nefsky
2011). It might be that the patient is more disposed to report painfulness in Oj than in
Oj+1 even though they feel exactly the same. This is because one’s verbal reports could be
influenced not only by the underlying phenomenal states, but also by non-phenomenal states
like tissue damage. The fact that two adjacent states yield differing verbal dispositions does
mean that the agent is sensitive to some differences between the two outcome states, but not
that those differences show up in her phenomenology.19
19Kagan (2011, 136) is alert to this problem and replies that ‘it is important to bear in mind that these
[reports] are indeed immediate and spontaneous reports concerning the qualitative aspects of the victim’s
experiences. The victim is simply reporting how the state feels to him, with regard to whether it involves
pain, or whether the amount of pain differs from that involved in other states.’ But it is not at all clear that
even if we try, we can make our verbal reports sensitive only to our introspective phenomenology. Of course,
Kagan can just stipulate that the patient is responding only to her phenomenology, but then the argument
could be simpler, and indeed more similar to my own. He could leave out the verbal reports and simply point
out that the painfulness of O0 and the painfulness of On differ and that feels the same as is an equivalence
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Second, even if we assume that differing verbal reports mean a difference in how the states
feel, this would only show that there must be two adjacent states that don’t feel the same.
It would not show that there must be two adjacent states that fail to be exactly as painful
as each other. For it is at least logically possible for one state to be exactly as painful as
another state even though the two don’t feel the same. Similarly, it is logically possible for
two visibly different paintings to be exactly as beautiful as each other, or for two things to
be (or look) exactly as red as each other without looking the same, for instance if one is a
bit greenish and the other a bit blueish, but they are equally far from pure red.20
My strategy also has the advantage of not being tied exclusively to phenomenal properties.
Nefsky (2011, 374) considers a consequentialist view on which fairness is morally relevant:
Now, imagine that there is a large supply of clean water that two impoverished
communities, A and B, have equal claim to and that will be distributed by an
international committee. The fair outcome would be for the water to be divided
approximately evenly between the two communities. Approximately evenly be-
cause—I think we can say—fairness is not, in this case, an extremely precise
matter. A few drops of water more or less on one side does not make the distri-
bution unfair (or even any less fair) in any morally relevant sense of the term.
But is exactly as F as must always be an equivalence relation, regardless of whether F
is a phenomenal property, a normative property, or anything else. Hence is exactly as fair
as is an equivalence relation as well. More generally, is exactly as good as is an equivalence
relation, and so no matter what is morally valuable, there cannot be a sequence of states
with the first better than the last but each exactly as good as its predecessor.
relation, and hence there must be adjacent states that don’t feel the same.
20Even functionalists about pain will grant that pain involves not only verbal dispositions, but other
dispositions as well, such as a disposition to grimace. We can then imagine two states S1 and S2, such that
one is slightly more disposed to report being in pain in S1 than in S2, but one is slightly more disposed to
grimace in S2 than in S1. These differing dispositions may suffice for the two states to feel different, but if
they exactly balance each other, the states will nonetheless count as exactly as painful as each other.
One might object that in the cases I’ve discussed, the two things cannot be exactly as beautiful, as red,
or as painful as each other if they look or feel different. Instead they can only be ‘on a par’ with respect to
beauty or redness. I discuss parity in the next section.
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4 Parity
But wait! I have argued that is exactly as F as is always an equivalence relation. But the
fact that is exactly as good as is an equivalence relation does not suffice to show that all
collective action problems are triggering cases. All that this fact shows is that there cannot
be a sequence of states with the first better than the last and each state exactly as good as
its predecessor. But a triggering case, as defined above, is one involving a sequence of states
with the first better than the last and where some state is worse than its predecessor.
Arguably, one thing can be neither better, nor worse, nor exactly as good as another.
Some philosophy job P might be neither better nor worse than some journalism job J , which
is also neither better nor worse than the philosophy job with an extra $100 (P+). Given the
transitivity of is exactly as good as, P and P+ cannot each be exactly as good as J , since
P+ is better than P . Instead, at least one of them must be on a par with J (Chang 2002).
Hence, it is compatible with the view I defended in the previous section that there be
a sequence of states such that the first is better than the last and yet each state is neither
better nor worse nor exactly as good as its predecessor in the sequence.21
The harmless torturers case is not such a case. Parity with respect to F -ness can arise
only when there are multiple factors relevant to how F a thing is, but no precise way of
assigning weights to those factors so as to enable precise trade-offs. For instance, if how large
something is depends on both how heavy and how tall it is, but there are no precise weights
assigned to the two dimensions of heaviness and tallness, there can be cases where one thing
is neither larger nor smaller nor exactly as large as another. But in the harmless torturers
case, the kind of pain involved in each state is the same, and the only thing that varies is its
intensity. This means there will be no parity between any of the states.
But climate change may be a case in which there is a sequence of possible outcomes
21Compare Nefsky’s (2011, 382) complaint that Kagan shows at most that some state must feel different
than predecessor, and not that it feels worse. She does not discuss parity, however.
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where the first is better than the last, but none is worse than its predecessor. Things would
be better if everyone reduced emissions than if no one did so. But it may be that no tiny
increment in emissions would make the outcome worse; instead, it would leave it exactly
as good as, or on a par with, how it would otherwise have been.22 After all, even where a
small increment in emissions causes a morally relevant difference, the difference needn’t be
all bad: some people will feel less comfortable, others more so; some animals will have less
food, others more; and so on. And there may be no way of assigning precise weights to these
various harms and benefits. Indeed, in many collective action problems, our acts may affect
the number and identities of the people who exist, and the kinds of harms and benefits that
accrue to different people; these are the sorts of differences that may yield parity between
outcomes. We can also modify the harmless torturers case to introduce parity:
Harmless Torturers (Parity Version)
There is a patient hooked up to a torture machine and n other people (including
you), each facing a switch. If no one flips, the patient feels almost no pain. If
everyone flips, the patient feels excrutiating pain. But there are two kinds of
pain: burning pain and throbbing pain. And as more switches are flipped, the
pain intensity increases, but alternates between burning pain and throbbing pain.
So, O0 means throbbing pain of intensity 1, O1 means burning pain of intensity
2, O2 means throbbing pain of intensity 3, and so on. In addition, there is parity
among types of pain, such that burning pain of intensity x is neither better nor
worse nor exactly as bad as throbbing pain of intensity x± 1.
Here, the outcome will be much better if no one flips their switch than if everyone does,
but no outcome is worse than its predecessor. Thus, you know that, regardless of how many
others flip, your flipping will not bring about a worse outcome than not flipping.
Does that mean that it is permissible for you to flip your switch? That depends on
the correct theory of decision making under uncertainty and parity. Schoenfield (2014, 267)
endorses a principle for decision-making under parity which says that it is permissible for you
22cf. Andreou (2006), who likens cases of pollution to Quinn’s (1990) case of the self-torturer with intran-
sitive preferences, though she does not claim that betterness itself is non-transitive (Andreou 2018).
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to flip. For her LINK principle says, in part, that ‘If you are rationally certain that neither
of the two options [A and B] will bring about greater value than the other, it’s not required
that you choose A, and it’s not required that you choose B.’
But a different decision theory, Prospectism (Hare 2010; see also Weirich 2004), prohibits
flipping, at least given complete uncertainty about how many other people will flip. With
parity, the betterness ordering can be incomplete and hence not representable by a value
function that assigns one outcome a greater real number than another outcome if and only
if the former is better than the latter. For it may be that O1 is not better than O2, O2
is not better than O3, and yet O1 is better than O3. But there are no real numbers such
that x ≤ y, y ≤ z, and yet x > y. We can, however, consider value functions representing
coherent completions of the betterness ordering, where V represents a coherent completion
of that betterness ordering just in case, for all Oi and Oj, V (Oi) > V (Oj) if (but not only if)
Oi is better than Oj. (Think of a coherent completion of a betterness ordering as one that
respects the original ordering’s better than relations but also eliminates parity by taking each
instance of some Oi being on a par with Oj and replacing it with Oi’s being either better
than, worse than, or equally good as Oj.) Prospectism then says:
Prospectism: It is permissible to perform an action if and only if, for some value
function V that represents a coherent completion of the betterness ordering, no
alternative action has higher expected value relative to V .
My aim is not to provide a defense of Prospectism, but simply to show that it gives
consequentialism a way of prohibiting exceptional acts in parity-laden collective action prob-
lems.23 And let me first flag that my argument will rely only on the left-to-right (or ‘only if’)
23The debate over decision-making under parity and uncertainty has focused on a different kind of case
(Hare 2010; Schoenfield 2014). Suppose A and B are on a par. As such, mildly sweetening one of them (say,
by adding $5 to it), converting it to A+ or B+, would not make it better than the other. Now suppose
there are two opaque boxes. One contains A and the other contains B, with the arrangement determined by
a fair coin. And you can see left-hand box has a $5 note on top of it. Question: Are you required to take
the (sweetened) left-hand box? Prospectism says ‘yes.’ For taking the left-hand box is associated with the
prospect {0.5 chance of A+, 0.5 chance of B+}, while taking the right-hand box is associated with the prospect
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direction of Prospectism, meaning that any decision theory which agrees with its necessary
condition for permissibility will allow consequentialism to get the same desired result.
Now, suppose you are completely uncertain about how many other people will flip their
switches, such that you have a uniform probability distribution over the states S0, ..., Sn−1
(where Sj is the state where exactly j-many other people flip). In this case, Prospectism
prohibits flipping. This is because each ‘intermediate’ outcome O1, ..., On−1 has the same
( 1
n
) probability of resulting from you flipping as from you not flipping and hence can be
ignored; they cannot make a difference to the relative expected values of flipping and not
flipping. (To illustrate, if n > 17, outcome O17 would result from your flipping if S16 is actual,
and would result from your not flipping if S17 is actual, but by our setup S16 and S17 are
equiprobable.) As for the non-intermediate outcomes O0 and On, flipping has probability 0 of
yielding O0 and probability
1
n
of yielding On, while not flipping has probability
1
n
of yielding
O0 and probability 0 of yielding On. But since O0 is better than On, each value function
representing a coherent completion of the betterness ordering assigns the former a higher
number than the latter. Therefore, relative to each value function representing a coherent
completion of the betterness ordering, flipping has lower expected value than not flipping.24
Another way to put this is that flipping is stochastically dominated by not flipping, where
A stochastically dominates B just in case for each outcome O, the probability of yielding an
outcome at least as good as O is at least as great for A as for B, and for some outcome O∗,
{0.5 chance of A, 0.5 chance of B}, and relative to any value function representing a coherent completion of
the betterness ordering, the former prospect has higher expected value than the latter. Schoenfield’s LINK
principle says ‘no,’ since you know that, no matter how the coin landed, the contents of the left-hand box
are not better than the contents of the right-hand one (since A+ is not better than B, nor is B+ better than
A). Without going fully into the arguments for and against each response to the two opaque boxes case, let
me add that it is a messy affair designing a full decision theory that entails LINK. The only one I am aware
of is Hare’s Deferentialism, which is considerably more complex than Prospectism. If parsimony is a virtue
in normative theorizing as well as in empirical inquiry, this may be one reason to favor Prospectism.
24Put in terms of symbols, the point is that for all Vi:
EVi(¬flip) = 1n × Vi(O0) + 1n × Vi(O1) + ...+ 1n × Vi(On−1) + 0× Vi(On)
EVi(flip) = 0× Vi(O0) + 1n × Vi(O1) + ...+ 1n × Vi(On−1) + 1n × Vi(On)
Hence, EVi(¬flip) > EVi(flip) iff Vi(O0) > Vi(On)
But, since O0 is better than On, Vi(O0) > Vi(On), and so for all Vi, EVi(¬flip) > EVi(flip)
25
the probability of yielding an outcome at least as good as O∗ is strictly greater for A than
for B. And Prospectism prohibits stochastically dominated actions (Bader 2018). (Note that
flipping is also stochastically dominated in the original harmless torturers case, provided you
have a uniform probability distribution over hypotheses about how many others will flip.
Therefore, even if you are unconvinced by my treatment of that case, consequentialism will
still prohibit flipping, given any decision theory that prohibits stochastically dominated acts.)
Thus, if Prospectism is correct, consequentialism can prohibit the exceptional act of flip-
ping even in this parity-laden, non-triggering case. This result holds provided you are uncer-
tain how others will act. Now, if you knew exactly how many others would flip, Prospectism
would permit flipping. As for intermediate cases, where you are neither completely uncertain
nor completely knowledgable about how others will act, the devil is in the details; whether
Prospectism prohibits flipping will depend on exactly how far your probability distribution
deviates from uniformity and ‘how much’ parity there is in the betterness ordering.25 But
25If you deviate from a uniform probability distribution over the states S0,...Sn−1, flipping is no longer
stochastically dominated and hence may be permitted by Prospectism. For there will be some intermediate
outcomes that are more probable if you flip than if you don’t. If a value function assigns sufficiently high
value to those outcomes, flipping will then have highest expected value. But whether such a value function
is admissible will depend on the details of both the betterness ordering and your probability function.
The point is best seen with a modification of the opaque boxes case in footnote 23. In this new version,
suppose that there is probability n 6= 0.5 that A was placed in the (sweetened) left-hand box. Taking the
left-hand box (L) is associated with the prospect {n chance of A+, 1 − n chance of B+}, while taking the
right-hand box (R) is associated with the prospect {1 − n chance of A, n chance of B}. So, for any value
function Vi, EVi(L) = n× Vi(A+) + (1− n)× Vi(B+), while EVi(R) = (1− n)× Vi(A) + n× Vi(B).
Without loss of generality, let n > 0.5. Then, EVi(R) ≥ EVi(L) only if both (a) Vi(B) > Vi(A+) and
(b) Vi(B)−Vi(A+)Vi(B+)−Vi(A) ≥ 1−nn . Such an admissible value function will exist if the only facts about the betterness
ordering are that A+ is better than A and that B+ is better than B. But in more realistic cases, there will be
additional facts about the betterness ordering will constrain admissible value functions. When (a) obtains,
Vi(B)−Vi(A+)
Vi(B+)−Vi(A) increases (with an asymptotic upper bound of 1) as Vi(A+)−Vi(A) and Vi(B+)−Vi(B) decrease
and as Vi(B)− Vi(A+) increases. But additional facts about the betterness ordering may put a lower bound
on how far A+ and B+ must be ranked above A and B, respectively, and an upper bound on how far B
can be ranked above A+. How much by way of additional constraints are needed to render R impermissible
depends on the value of n, with more constraints needed as n approaches 1. This is because 1−nn decreases as
n increases, thereby making it ‘easier’ to find an admissible value function that jointly satisfies (a) and (b).
The details are messy, but the moral is simple: In both the opaque boxes case and the parity version of
the harmless torturers case, Prospectism prohibits taking the right-hand box or flipping your switch if your
probability distribution over the relevant states is uniform. Otherwise, it may permit such acts, though this
will depend on the details of the probability distribution and the betterness ordering involved.
26
this limitation may not be terribly serious, for we have already seen that consequentialism
will not prohibit exceptional acts in all collective action problems. At most, it will do so in
realistic cases in which you’re very uncertain how others will act. I have shown that parity
need not threaten this more modest claim.26
Is Prospectism compatible with consequentialism? There is one way of characterizing
consequentialism on which the two are not compatible. On this gloss, consequentialism says
that an act is permissible just in case there is no alternative act which would yield a better
outcome. But this gloss is incompatible with any decision theoretic version of consequential-
ism, for it makes no reference to the agent’s subjective probabilities. Fortunately, there is
another standard gloss that leaves room for a decision theoretic version of consequentialism.
On this gloss, consequentialism says that the good is prior to the right, such that an act’s
permissibility depends only on the values of the possible outcomes of the available acts, as
well as the agent’s (rational) subjective probabilities. This gloss is neutral with respect to
which decision theory is correct and is therefore compatible with Prospectism.27
The issue, then, is not whether Prospectism is compatible with consequentialism, but sim-
ply whether it is correct. It is certainly somewhat counterintuitive that Prospectism some-
times prohibits an act which it is known will not yield a worse outcome than its alternatives.
But while this constitutes probably the most significant objection to Prospectism, it does not
mean that Prospectism is false, for there are also significant objections to non-Prospectist
26Broome (1997) regards incommensurability not as parity, but as vagueness or indeterminacy. Even if he
is wrong, it may also be indeterminate what the likely outcome of some action would be, for instance if it
is indeterminate what the threshold numbers are in a triggering case, or if it is indeterminate how precisely
you would perform the act in question. To deal with indeterminacy, consequentialists would do well to adopt
some Prospectism-like theory on which an act is prohibited if if it has sub-maximal expected value on to every
admissible way of resolving any indeterminacy. (For epistemicists (Williamson 1994), indeterminacy is a kind
of unknowability and hence rational uncertainty, and as such may not require any modification of expected
value theory.) See Hare (2011), Moss (2015), and Williams (2017) for further discussion of decision-making
given indeterminacy.
27Still, (act) consequentialism may be incompatible with certain ways of motivating decision theories. In
particular, it would be in tension with defending a decision theory on the basis of its tending to yield better
overall results in a sequence of choice situations (whether faced by a single agent at different times or by
different agents). Without going into details, however, let me just say that all of the defenses of Prospectism
cited below are based on grounds other than the results it is likely to yield when followed repeatedly.
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theories that avoid this oddity (Hare, 2010; Bader, 2018; Doody, 2019; Rabinowicz, ms).
Settling the matter requires evaluating all the arguments for and against Prospectism and
its competitors, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Prospec-
tism is a live possibility but that my conclusion is a conditional one: If Prospectism (or at
least its necessary condition for permissibility) is correct, then consequentialism can prohibit
exceptional acts even in parity-laden, non-triggering collective action problems.
5 Conclusion
Consequentialists have responded to a standard sort of collective action problem by arguing
(i) that all such cases are triggering cases, and (ii) that exceptional acts are prohibited in
triggering cases by virtue of having have sub-maximal expected value. Unfortunately, both
claims are false. Expected value theory won’t prohibit exceptional acts in some triggering
cases, since they involve infinities. And some collective action problems are not triggering
cases, since they involve parity.
Nonetheless, I conclude that many intuitively impermissible exceptional acts can still
be prohibited on consequentialist grounds. First, while consequentialism cannot prohibit
exceptional acts in some infinitary triggering cases, it likely does so in more realistic cases
where we have strong judgments of impermissibility. In such triggering cases, most of us
are sufficiently ignorant—both about the mechanisms involved and about how others will
act—that consequentialism will prohibit the exceptional act on expected value grounds.
Second, while I have argued that there cannot be a sequence of outcomes with the first
better than the last and each exactly as good as its predecessor, parity means there can
be a sequence of outcomes with the first better than the last and each not worse than
its predecessor. This means that not all collective action problems are triggering cases.
Nonetheless, consequentialism can still prohibit exceptional acts in such cases, provided that
28
Prospectism (or, again, at least its necessary condition for permissibility) is correct.
I conclude that consequentialism can prohibit exceptional acts in many, if not all, of the
sorts of collective action problems where we tend to judge that the exceptional act is indeed
impermissible. While consequentialists will likely welcome this conclusion, it does not entail
that the consequentialist treatment of collective action problems (let alone consequentialism
more generally) is correct. Whether consequentialism gives the correct verdict about per-
missibility in all collective action problems, and whether it gives the correct explanation of
these verdicts, are topics for another paper.28
28For helpful feedback, I would like to thank John Broome, Stephanie Collins, Mark Colyvan, Kevin Dorst,
Luke Elson, Daniel Greco, Alan Ha`jek, Caspar Hare, Shelly Kagan, Daniel Mun˜oz, Miriam Schoenfield,
Roger Schwarzschild, Sam Shpall, Nicholas JJ Smith, Jack Spencer, and Daniel Wodak, as well as audiences
at the University of Colorado-Boulder, MIT, Yale, the Australian National University, the Australian Catholic
University, the University of Adelaide, and the University of Sydney.
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